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This case turns on the application of the Employment Security Act and its related 
regulations to a set of egregious, but essentially uncontested, facts. The key findings of 
fact, which are not disputed by the parties, were made by an Administrative Law Judge 
and adopted in full by the Workforce Appeals Board of the Department of Workforce 
Services. 
The central question presented in this appeal is whether the Department of 
Workforce Services ("Department") properly applied the Employment Security Act to 
these undisputed facts. Claimants Christopher Guzman ("Guzman") and Thomas King 
("King") were terminated from their employment at Autoliv after the company 
discovered, during the course of a sexual harassment investigation, that Guzman and 
King had sent a large volume of "vulgar" and "sexually-explicit" e-mails using the 
company's computer system. [R. 53; R. 242] The Department reviewed these messages 
and found that "such material in the workplace could have subjected the employer to 
sexual harassment claims." [R. 132; R. 321] Nevertheless, because the Department 
believed that Guzman and King lacked disqualifying knowledge of their misconduct, the 
Department granted Claimants' applications for unemployment. 
The Department erred by allowing Guzman and King to collect unemployment 
benefits. Claimants violated numerous company policies and, more significantly, 
universal standards of conduct. As a result, this Court should reverse the Department's 




L THIS COURT OWES NO MORE THAN MODERATE DEFERENCE TO 
THE DEPARTMENTS APPLICATION OF THE EMPLOYMENT 
SECURITY ACT. 
A. The Applicable Standard of Review Requires This Court to Afford 
"Only Moderate Deference" to the Department's Application of the 
Employment Security Act. 
The issue of whether specific conduct is disqualifying under the Employment 
Security Act is a mixed question of law and fact.1 SOS Staffing Services, Inc. v. 
Workforce Appeals Bd., 983 P.2d 581, 583 ^8 (Utah Ct. App. 1999) (where the parties do 
not dispute the underlying material facts, "the Board's decision 'calls for the application 
of statutes and administrative rules to a specific factual situation.'") (quoting Professional 
Staff Management, Inc. v. Dep 't of Employment Sec, 953 P.2d 76, 79 (Utah Ct. App. 
1998)); accord Professional Staff Management, 953 P.2d at 79 ("[o]ur review of these 
[unemployment] cases calls for the application of statutes and administrative rules to a 
specific factual situation"). Utah appellate courts afford administrative decisions a 
degree of deference along a "sliding scale" of strictness, depending on the policy 
concerns, the agency's expertise, and whether the issue is fact-driven or susceptible to 
uniform rules. SOS Staffing Services, 983 P.2d 583. It is well-established that the 
"proper application of the Employment Security Act and the relevant rules requires little 
highly specialized or technical knowledge that would be uniquely within the 
"The terms 'application of the law' and 'mixed question of law and fact' have been used 
interchangeably by Utah appellate courts." HON. NORMAN H. JACKSON, Utah 
Standards of Appellate Review—Revised, Utah Bar Journal, Oct. 1999, at 8, 53 n.31. 
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Department's expertise." Id. at 584-85; Professional Staff Management, 953 P.2d at 79 
(internal punctuation and citation omitted). Accordingly, this Court affords "only 
moderate deference" to the Department's decision to grant unemployment benefits. 
Professional Staff Management, 953 P.2d at 79-80; SOS Staffing Services, 953 P.2d at 
584. 
B. The Standard of Review Suggested by the Department is Inapplicable 
and Obsolete. 
This Court should reject the Department's bid for unwarranted deference. The 
Department contends that "this case involves a question of fact and the standard of 
review is 'highly deferential, requiring reversal only if the finding is clearly erroneous . . . 
and not supported by substantial evidence.'" Appellee's Brief at 1. The Department then 
concludes that its decision to grant unemployment benefits to the Claimants should be 
"reversefd] only upon a plain abuse of discretion." Id. The Department's argument thus 
combines a false premise with outdated case authority. The Department begins by 
mischaracterizing Autoliv's appeal as a challenge to the agency's factual findings, and 
then proceeds by relying on case authority older than the governing statute. 
This appeal does not contest the Department's essential factual findings; rather, 
Autoliv challenges the Department's application of the Employment Security Act to 
those facts. The key facts remain undisputed: (1) Autoliv has policies prohibiting sexual 
harassment and non-business usage of its e-mail system; (2) Autoliv sent warnings to 
Claimants that future violations of the e-mail policy would result in disciplinary action up 
to and including termination; (3) after receiving these warnings, Claimants used the 
3 
576834v2 
company's computer system to send numerous e-mail messages containing vulgar, 
offensive, and sexually-explicit materials; (4) Claimants confessed to having sent a large 
volume of inappropriate e-mail messages; and (5) Autoliv terminated Claimants as a 
direct result of this misconduct. 
The Department's effort to cast its own legal conclusions as factual findings 
should be rejected. For example, the Department's position that Claimants lacked 
disqualifying knowledge is not a finding of fact; rather, it is a legal conclusion resulting 
from the Department's flawed application of selected facts to administrative law. 
It is also notable that the Department does not rely on this Court's recent 
pronouncements on the proper standard of review in unemployment cases. Instead, to 
argue that this Court can reverse "only upon a plain abuse of discretion," the Department 
reaches back to Pacheco v. Bd. of Review, 1X1 P.2d 712 (Utah 1986), a case that predates 
the adoption of the Uniform Administrative Procedures Act ("UAPA"). See Appellee's 
Brief at 1. Given that "Utah courts should not ignore the standards of review pronounced 
by the Utah Legislature," it follows that this Court should rely on the standard of review 
established by the UAPA as interpreted in SOS Staffing and Professional Staff 
Management. Bradley v. Pay son City Corp., 413 Utah Adv. Rep. 13, 19 n.3 (Utah Ct. 
576834v2 
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App. 2000) (Jackson, J., dissenting).2 Accordingly, this Court should follow its recent 
precedent by granting no more than moderate deference to the Department's application 
of the Employment Security Act. 
C. Because Claimants Transgressed Universal Standards of Conduct, the 
Department's Decision Deserves Little or No Deference. 
Although Autoliv acknowledges that the prevailing standard of review allows 
"only moderate deference" to be granted to the Department's interpretation of its 
regulations and the Employment Security Act, the rationale for even this level of 
deference fails in this case. The Utah Administrative Code provides that an employer 
may establish the "knowledge" prong by showing that the employee violated a universal 
standard of conduct. See UTAH ADMIN. CODE R994-405-202(2) (2000). Universal 
standards of conduct are presumed to be generally understood by every worker. By 
definition, no special knowledge or expertise is required to interpret universal standards 
of conduct. For this reason, the Department can hardly claim a monopoly or any primacy 
in its ability to interpret universal standards of conduct. The justification for granting 
even modest deference to the Department's decision thus melts away. 
The "only moderate deference" standard has also been recognized as the applicable 
standard of review by the leading treatise on Utah's standards for appellate review. See 
HON. NORMAN H. JACKSON, Utah Standards of Appellate Review—Revised, Utah Bar 
Journal, Oct. 1999, at 48 ("Whether [the] agency properly applied the Employment 
Security Act and pertinent rules" is a mixed question of law and fact where the 
agency's decision is granted "'only moderate deference' because proper application of 
the governing law 'requires little highly specialized or technical knowledge that would 
be uniquely within the Department's expertise.'") (citation omitted). 
576834v2 
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This Court should therefore consider affording only modest, if any, deference to 
the Department's legal determination that workers may use company equipment to 
propagate pornographic images without violating any universal standard of the conduct. 
II. THE DEPARTMENT'S "JUST CAUSE" STANDARD CANNOT BE MORE 
STRINGENT THAN THE STATUTORY STANDARD FOR 
DISQUALIFICATION. 
The Department should not be permitted to inflate its "just cause" criteria into a 
more rigorous standard for disqualification than the Utah Legislature established through 
the Employment Security Act. The Employment Security Act provides as follows: 
An individual is ineligible for benefits . . . [when] the claimant was 
discharged for just cause for an act or omission in connection with 
employment, not constituting a crime, which is deliberate, willful, or 
wanton and adverse to the employer's rightful interest, if so found by 
the division. 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 35A-4-405(2)(a) (Supp. 2000) (emphasis added). 
The Department has taken the position that it is "no longer necessary to adjudicate 
cases under the 'deliberate, willful, or wanton and adverse to the employer's rightful 
interest' standard" as defined in the Employment Security Act. Appellee's Brief at 14. 
Instead, the Department argues that its "just cause" standard should prevail because it is 
either equal to or less stringent than the statute. Id. at 14-15. 
The Department's application of its regulations, including its criteria for "just 
cause" discharges, must always comport with the standards established by the Legislature 
576834v2 
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in this statute/ The present case illustrates the dangers of the Department's effort to 
elevate its administrative standard at the expense of the Legislature's mandate. Indeed, 
by misapplying its "just cause" criteria to protect employees who spread sexually-explicit 
materials through the workplace, the Department reached a result that cannot be 
reconciled with its statutory mandate. 
Under the standard defined by the Employment Security Act, Claimants should be 
disqualified from receiving unemployment compensation. The Department's factual 
findings amply demonstrate that Claimants deliberately engaged in conduct adverse to 
Autoliv's rightful interests. For example, the Department found that Claimants sent 
numerous personal messages through Autoliv's computer system with "vulgar," 
"offensive" and "sexually explicit" material.4 [R. 53; R. 132; R. 242; R. 321] The 
Department also found that Claimants' distribution of this "material in the workplace 
could have subjected the employer to sexual harassment claims." [R. 132; R. 321] This 
fear was not unfounded. Indeed, the Department's factual findings noted that Autoliv 
had discovered Claimants' misconduct during its investigation of a harassment complaint 
from a former employee.5 [R. 53; R. 242] 
3
 "[N]o agency enjoys the discretion to exceed the authority vested in it by the Legislature 
and such will be reviewed for legal error, without deference." HON. NORMAN H. 
JACKSON, Utah Standards of Appellate Review—Revised, Utah Bar Journal, Oct. 1999, 
at 8, 53 n.30 (citations and internal punctuation omitted). 
Several of these messages contained short videos with strong sexual themes. For 
example, one video carried the title "Wedding Night" whereas another contained close-
up images of a woman simulating fellatio. [R. 14; R. 15; R. 17-19] 
This finding of fact was made by the Administrative Law Judge. The Department then 
adopted the ALJ's findings of fact in whole. See R. 131, R. 320. 
7 
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The Department thus erred in its application of the Employment Security Act by 
not considering the employer's rightful interests. Autoliv, like all Utah employers, has a 
compelling interest in preventing and prohibiting all forms of illegal workplace 
discrimination, including sexual harassment. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 34A-5-101 et seq. 
(Utah Anti-Discrimination Act prohibits discrimination based on race, color, national 
origin, gender, religion, age, and disability). In this case, the Department made a factual 
finding that Claimants' conduct generated potential liability for the company. It 
necessarily follows that Claimants' voluntary and deliberate misconduct was adverse to 
the company's rightful interests. 
The Department thus failed to properly apply the Department's own factual 
findings to the standards established by statute. Claimants' deliberate conduct was 
inherently adverse to Autoliv's rightful interests. As a result, Claimants should be 
disqualified from receiving unemployment benefits. 
III. THE DEPARTMENT SHOULD HAVE DISQUALIFIED CLAIMANTS 
FROM RECEIVING UNEMPLOYMENT UNDER ITS "JUST CAUSE" 
STANDARD. 
The Department misapplied both the Employment Security Act and the 
administrative regulations defining "just cause" by not disqualifying Claimants from 
collecting unemployment insurance. The applicable provisions of the Utah 
Administrative Code explain that an employer may establish "just cause" for ineligibility 
by showing: (1) the employee had knowledge of expected conduct; (2) the offending 
conduct fell within the employee's power and capacity to control; and (3) culpability. 
See UTAH ADMIN. CODE R994-405-202 (2000). In its decision, the Department held that 
8 
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the second and third elements were satisfied by the Claimants' misconduct. Only the 
Department's application of the first criterion remains at issue. 
As explained below, the Department failed to properly apply its factual findings to 
the "knowledge" criterion, which explains that "the worker must have had knowledge of 
the conduct the employer expected." UTAH ADMIN. CODE R994-405-202(2). The 
employer can establish disqualifying knowledge by showing either (1) that the 
employee's behavior violated a universal standard of conduct or (2) that the employee 
violated a clear policy that had been articulated by the employer. Id. In this case, the 
Department's factual findings indicate Claimants violated both universal standards of 
conduct and several of Autoliv's policies by sending vulgar, sexually-explicit e-mails 
using the company's computer equipment. Autoliv thus carried its burden of establishing 
that Claimants had knowledge and were properly discharged for just cause. The 
Department's decision should be reversed and Claimants denied unemployment benefits. 
A. Claimants Violated Universal Standards of Conduct By Sending 
Sexually-Explicit and Offensive Messages on Autoliv's Computer 
System. 
The Department's decision cannot withstand reasonable scrutiny because 
Claimants offended universal standards of conduct by distributing obscene and otherwise 
objectionable material through Autoliv's computer system. Public policy requires the 
reversal of the Department's decision because such behavior is incompatible with the 
workplace and may be unlawful. 
The Department erred when it failed to apply universal standards of conduct to 
factual findings that beg for such interpretation. For example, the Department found that 
9 
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"some of the material [disseminated by Claimants] was sexually explicit and offensive" 
and that "[s]uch material in the workplace could have subjected the employer to sexual 
harassment claims." [R. 132; R. 321] Of course, this danger was not hypothetical. As 
the Department noted, Autoliv uncovered Claimants' misconduct after "receiving] a 
complaint from a former employee that some current employees were harassing her with 
inappropriate material on the e-mail." [R. 53; R. 242] Autoliv determined during its 
investigation that Claimants were "significantly involved in the e-mail abuse." [R. 53; R. 242] 
The Department should have disqualified Guzman and King from receiving 
unemployment because of this misconduct. After all, Utah courts have recognized that 
"sexual harassment is simply unacceptable in today's society." Retherford v. AT&T 
Communications, 844 P.2d 949, 978 (Utah 1992). Given the Department's position that 
Claimants' distribution of vulgar materials in the workplace could constitute sexual 
harassment, it should invariably follow that Claimants transgressed universal standards of 
workplace conduct. [R. 132; R. 321] 
The Department's failure to apply a universal standard of conduct to its own 
factual findings undermines its decision. The Department's opposition brief is silent on 
this subject, and its silence is not surprising. No Utah employer can permit or condone 
the distribution of obscene and pornographic materials in its workplace. Yet the 
Department cannot concede this issue and still prevail in this case. Under the "just 
cause" standard championed by the Department, the "knowledge" element is satisfied if 
the claimant violated a universal standard of conduct. 
5768 Mv2 
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Accordingly, if this Court finds—as Autoliv believes it must—that Claimants' 
misconduct was incompatible with universal standards of workplace behavior, the 
Department's decision cannot stand. This Court must reverse the Department's ruling 
and render Claimants ineligible for unemployment benefits. 
B. Claimants Violated Numerous Company Policies By Transmitting 
Offensive and Sexually-Explicit Materials Using Autoliv's Computer 
System. 
Although this Court need not reach this issue if it finds that Claimants violated 
universal standards of conduct, the Department's decision is marred by additional error. 
The Department misapplied its factual findings to the administrative regulations that 
provide for disqualification based on a violation of company policies. As explained 
below, the Department's factual findings indicate that (1) Claimants knowingly and 
deliberately violated numerous company policies; (2) Claimants received numerous 
warnings about the conduct for which they were terminated; and (3) Claimants were 
aware that their misconduct could result in termination. As a result, the Claimants had 
disqualifying knowledge of their misconduct. The Department's decision must therefore 
be reversed. 
1. Claimants' Terminations Were Justified Because Claimants 
Violated Numerous Company Policies. 
Autoliv satisfied the "knowledge" element of the "just cause" standard by showing 
that Claimants were given written policies spelling out the company's expected standards 
of behavior. See UTAH ADMIN. CODE R994-405-202. While the Department's decision 
addresses only Autoliv's e-mail policy, Claimants did not violate this policy alone. By 
11 
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sending "inappropriate," "offensive," "vulgar," and "sexual-explicit" e-mails on 
Autoliv's computer system, despite several warnings to the contrary, Claimants failed to 
abide by numerous other policies. [R. 53; R. 132; R. 242; R. 321] At the very least, 
Claimants' misconduct violated the following company policies: 
• Autoliv 's sexual harassment policy, which states that the company will not 
"tolerate or permit illegal harassment or retaliation of any nature." [R. 5] 
• Autoliv's computer use policy, which prohibits (1) "[unauthorized or 
inappropriate computer use," (2) "[u]se of e-mail for reasons other than 
transmittal of business related information," and (3) "[cjonduct that reflects 
unfavorably upon the corporation." [R. 2] 
• Autoliv's e-mail policy, which specified that "E-mail should be used for 
company business communication only" and that "[i]f you receive an 
inappropriate E-mail, delete it and do not forward it to anyone." [R. 10-11] 
• Autoliv's policy for general conduct, which states that "each employee is 
expected to maintain conduct consistent with job efficiency and accepted 
standards of behavior for a business environment." [R. 4] 
The Department thus erred because Claimants engaged in conduct that clearly 
violated several of Autoliv's reasonable rules and standards of conduct. By 
acknowledging only the e-mail policy, the Department totally ignored Autoliv's rightful 
interest in enforcing its other policies such as those prohibiting sexual harassment and 
dishonorable conduct. After all, Claimants were not discharged for a minor infraction of 
the e-mail policy; rather, Claimants were terminated for just cause because they violated 
numerous company policies when they trafficked in obscenity on company time with 
company property. 
2. Autoliv Issued Several Warnings to Claimants Regarding 
Proper Computer Usage. 
Autoliv was entitled to terminate Claimants for just cause because they persisted 
in abusing their e-mail privileges after receiving at least three warnings. Each of these 
12 
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cautions came with clear instructions to stop sending videos Jokes, and non-business 
materials through the company's computer accounts. Such clear warnings satisfy the 
"knowledge" element of the Utah Administrative Code's "just cause" criteria: 
A specific warning is one way to show the worker had knowledge of the 
expected conduct. After a warning the worker should have been given 
an opportunity to correct the objectionable conduct. 
UTAH ADMIN. CODE R994-405-202 
The Department did not properly apply this administrative provision to its factual 
findings. After first finding that Autoliv had sent Claimants "[a]t least three company 
memos . . . regarding appropriate use of e-mail," and then noting that these notices 
warned that future violations "could result in disciplinary action and/or termination," the 
Department inexplicably ignored the legal import of these warnings. [R. 53; R. 242; 
R. 11] 
The Department thus misapplied the law to undisputed facts. Utah courts permit 
zero tolerance of sexual harassment, yet Guzman and King three times ignored the 
Company's mandates and imperiled their employment by repeatedly transmitting 
sexually-explicit materials via company e-mail.7 Because Claimants knew that they were 
The Department also argues that there is "an inconsistency between the way Autoliv's 
policies are written and the way they are enforced." Appellee's Brief at 12. This 
argument is belied by the testimony of Claimant Thomas King, who acknowledged that 
Autoliv has consistently enforced its prohibition against pornography in the workplace: 
"I know that some of the E-mail that - there has [sic] been other people that have been 
terminated for pornography and things like that, I understand that, and I agree with 
that." [R.240, 18:16-18] 
The Department's decision focused almost exclusively the quantity of Claimants' 
e-mail messages rather than on their sexually-explicit content. The severity of the 
13 
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engaging in misconduct, this Court should strike out the Department's decision and deny 
unemployment benefits to Claimants. 
3. Claimants Should Have Anticipated the Consequences of Their 
Misconduct Because Autoliv Clearly and Repeatedly Articulated 
Its Policies. 
The Department erred in its application of the "knowledge" criterion because 
Autoliv repeatedly articulated the company's expectations for conduct and the 
consequences of misconduct. Both Guzman and King admitted that they received 
Autoliv's handbook, which included the company's general conduct, sexual harassment, 
discipline, and computer usage policies. [R. 51, 18:33-35, 19:24-26; R. 240, 19:5-7, 32-
35] The Department also found that Autoliv had, on at least three occasions, distributed 
to Claimants copies of the company's e-mail policy, which states that "E-mail was for 
o 
business use only." 
Autoliv put all of its employees on notice that policy violations could result in 
termination. The discipline policy explains that "[disciplinary action may be taken for 
violation of any single rule or combination of rules, or for other improper conduct" and 
that such disciplinary action "may include . . . termination." [R. 4] Autoliv also 
discipline imposed on Claimants came as a consequence both of the volume and nature 
of the messages. 
o 
Guzman admitted that he had not read one of the messages containing the warning that 
violations of the company's computer and e-mail policies could result in discipline 
"including] termination." [R. 7-8] Apparently Guzman believed that truly business-
related e-mail messages—such as Roger Tea's memorandum, which was addressed to 
all employees—were "junk mail." [R. 51, 21:14-15, 31-33] It was Guzman's habit to 
delete and ignore such messages. In contrast, Guzman somehow found the time to open 
576834v2 
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conveyed the importance of its computer use and e-mail policies by warning that 
transgressions of these policies could result in termination. [R. 6; R. 7-8; R. 10-11] 
Claimants thus knew that they were violating company policies and thus 
imperiling their jobs when they spread offensive materials using Autoliv's network. 
Indeed, Autoliv's investigation found a remarkable e-mail that King sent to a colleague 
on December 14, 1999. King tacitly acknowledged that he was jeopardizing his job by 
sending obscene e-mails, writing: 
When I send you things please be very discrete about it before 
showing anyone. [SJome of the things I get is [sic] a little risque for 
most viewers and I do like my job a little, 
[R. 188 (emphasis added)] 
This evidence contradicts the Board's explanation that "the claimant did not know 
his usage of the employer's e-mail was of such serious concern to the employer that he 
was in danger of discharge." [R. 132; R. 321] In fact, Claimants were keenly aware that 
their conduct was inconsistent with Autoliv's standards and could warrant immediate 




discharge. As a result, Autoliv established the "knowledge" prong of the "just cause" 
standard. The Department's decision should be reversed.9 
IV. AUTOLIV PROPERLY MARSHALED THE EVIDENCE IN THIS 
APPEAL. 
There is no merit to the Department's accusation that Autoliv failed to marshal the 
evidence. More than a dozen pages in Autoliv's opening brief are devoted to a thorough 
recitation of the facts, and Autoliv mentioned all of the facts relied upon by the 
Department in reaching its adverse decision. The Department's allegation that Autoliv 
"only marshaled the evidence in support of the outcome it desires" rings hollow. 
Appellee's Brief at 6. Notably, the Department did not identify a single material fact 
supposedly absent from Autoliv ys statement of facts. Instead, the Department weakly 
complains that Autoliv added emphasis to two sentences of Roger Tea's September 8, 
The Department also defends its decision by advancing a new argument: that the 
"knowledge" prong was not satisfied because Autoliv allegedly failed to follow a 
progressive disciplinary policy. See Appellee's Brief at 10-14. This contention fails for 
several reasons. First, neither the ALJ nor the Appeals Board made a finding that Autoliv 
had a progressive disciplinary policy. See R. 52-56; R. 131-135; R. 241-245; R. 320-324. 
Such a finding would have not have been consistent with the evidence, particularly in 
light of the terms of Autoliv's policies. The Department's new "finding" emerges from 
its interpretation of a single paragraph in Roger Tea's September 8, 1998 memorandum. 
This Court should reject the Department's effort to construct a wholesale, company-wide 
progressive discipline policy from a statement that included the qualification that 
disciplinary action "could include termination." [R. 7-8] 
Second, even if Autoliv had a progressive disciplinary policy, Autoliv would still have 
been entitled to terminate Claimants for just cause due to the "serious nature" of their 
misconduct. See Bhatia v. Dep 7 Employment Sec, 834 P.2d 574, 580 n.5 (Utah Ct. App. 
1992). Although the Department suggests that Autoliv should have merely issued a 
warning to Claimants after their conduct generated a complaint of sexual harassment, this 
Court has previously denied benefits when an employer with a progressive disciplinary 
policy terminated an employee for violating universal standards of conduct. Id. 
576814v2 
16 
1998 memorandum. This criticism seems particularly misplaced given that Autoliv 
reprinted the entire text, not selective passages, of Tea's letter in its opening brief. 
Although Autoliv's compilation of evidence is sufficient to satisfy any marshalling 
obligation, it is nevertheless important to note that the Department's argument begins 
from a false premise. The obligation to marshal the evidence arises where a party is 
challenging findings of fact made by an agency or trial court. See, e.g., HON. NORMAN 
H. JACKSON, Utah Standards of Appellate Review—Revised, Utah Bar Journal, Oct. 
1999, at 12, 44, 52 n.7. In this case, the Department purports to limit Autoliv's appeal to 
a challenge of the Department's findings of fact. Thus, the Department argues that 
"Autoliv has challenged the Workforce Appeals Board!'s factual findings that the 
claimants lacked sufficient knowledge in this instance to merit a denial of unemployment 
insurance benefits." Appellee's Brief at 9 (emphasis added). As explained above, this 
Court should resist the Department's efforts both to reclassify its legal conclusions as 
factual findings and to mischaracterize the nature of Autoliv's appeal. The Department's 
decision should be reversed because the Agency misapplied the Employment Security 
Act to the undisputed facts that Claimants disseminated sexually-explicit e-mails using 




Because Claimants Guzman and King engaged in disqualifying conduct by using 
their employer's computer system to distribute offensive, explicit, and sexually-oriented 
materials, this Court should reverse the decision of the Department of Workforce 
Services. Unemployment benefits should therefore be denied to Guzman and King. 
DATED this / 2 ^ day of February, 2001. 
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
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Paul C. Burke 
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